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(Study 4). Finally, we found that people failed to anticipate this effect of enduring distress, instead
believing that individuals who have previously endured emotionally distressing events would most
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Abstract

The current research found that participants who had previously endured an emotionally
distressing event (e.g., bullying) more harshly evaluated another person’s failure to endure a
similar distressing event compared to participants with no experience enduring the event and
those currently enduring the event. These effects emerged for naturally occurring (Studies 1, 3,
and 4), and experimentally-induced (Study 2) distressing events. This effect was driven by the
tendency for those who previously endured the distressing event to view the event as less
difficult to overcome (Study 3). Moreover, we demonstrate that the effect is specific to
evaluations of perceived failure: Compared to those with no experience, people who previously
endured a distressing event made less favorable evaluations of an individual failing to endure the
event, but made more favorable evaluations of an individual managing to endure the event
(Study 4). Finally, we found that people failed to anticipate this effect of enduring distress,
instead believing that individuals who have previously endured emotionally distressing events
would most favorably evaluate others’ failures to endure (Study 5). Taken together, these
findings present a paradox such that, in the face of struggle or defeat, the people we seek for
advice or comfort may be the least likely to provide it. (206 words)
Keywords: Affect, social judgment, hot-cold empathy gap, life events, compassion
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Having 'Been There' Doesn't Mean I Care: When Prior Experience Reduces Compassion
for Emotional Distress
Imagine an employee going through a rocky divorce. Struggling to endure the emotional
distress of the divorce, the employee decides to request a leave of absence from work. Imagine
further that the employee has to make this request to one of two supervisors. One of these
supervisors has no experience with divorce, while the other supervisor endured a similarly trying
divorce early in her career. Whom should the employee approach with this request?
Common sense might suggest that the supervisor who had endured divorce would be
more understanding of the employee’s plight. This intuition also has considerable empirical
support, with research demonstrating that prior experience with an emotionally distressing event
increases sympathy for others facing that same event (Batson et al., 1996; Loewenstein & Small,
2007). In the current research, we propose that, rather than being sympathetic, people who have
previously endured an emotionally distressing event may be prone to negatively evaluate others
who fail to endure a similar event. We argue that constrained memory for the impact of past
emotional distress (i.e., I can’t recall how difficult it was), combined with knowledge of their
own ability to endure the distressing event (i.e., I did it), leads people who have endured
distressing events to render more negative evaluations (i.e., Why can’t you do it too?). Thus,
while lay intution may encourage the employee to approach the supervisor who has lived through
divorce, the current research suggests that the employee may ultimately be penalized for doing
so.
The Benefits of Experience
The idea that prior experience with an emotionally distressing event1 can facilitate
sympathy is well supported. Research has shown that for a wide range of experiences—from
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childhood acne to physical abuse—people who have been through a distressing event tend to be
more sympathetic toward others facing the same event compared to those with no experience
(Barnett, Tetreault, Esper, & Bristow, 1986; Batson et al., 1996; Clore & Jeffery, 1972; Christy
& Voigt, 1994; Hodges, Kiel, Kramer, Veach, & Villaneuva, 2010). For example, Batson et al.
(1996) found that participants who had acne when they were younger experienced more empathy
and compassion when reading about an adolescent’s experience with acne than did those with no
such experience. Similarly, Christy and Voigt (1994) found that people who had been abused as
a child said that they would be more likely to intervene if they saw a child being abused than
were those who had never been abused. These findings suggest that prior experience with a
similar event facilitates the ease with which another’s perspective can be adopted, which
increases sympathetic responding (e.g., Bandura, 1969; Batson, 1987, 1991).
The literature described above captures situations in which someone who has endured an
emotionally distressing event evaluates someone else who is going through the same ordeal.
Much less is known about how previously enduring distress affects our evaluation of others who
fail to endure a similar event—that is, those who are unable to overcome or appropriately cope
with the emotional distress produced by a trying event. Other than cases involving extreme
emotional distress, there is a general expectation that people will manage to endure distressing
events (Kim, Thomas, Wilk, Castro, & Hoge, 2010; Schwartz, 2000). People recognize that a
soldier might be fearful of going on patrol, but there is an expectation that the soldier will
complete his or her task. People recognize that being the target of bullying is emotionally
challenging, but nevertheless expect a bullied student to cope in normatively appropriate ways
and not, for example, resort to physical violence or dropping out of school. Unfortunately, people
often fall short of these expectations (e.g., Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004).
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This paper examines how individuals who have previously endured an emotionally
distressing event evaluate those who fail to endure similar distressing events. One possibility is
that the shared experience breeds compassion. That is, those who have endured a distressing
event in the past will have more compassion for those who fail to endure a similar situation. A
second hypothesis, and the one endorsed here, is that those who have endured a distressing event
in the past will in fact have less compassion for those who fail to endure a similar distressing
event. Research on the hot-cold empathy gap and task completion support our prediction.
The Potential Downside of Enduring Distress
The hot-cold empathy gap suggests that difficulties recalling the impact of past emotional
distress may lead people who have endured distress to be less compassionate toward others’
failures to endure. First described by Loewenstein (1996), empathy gaps capture the tendency for
people who are not affectively aroused (i.e., in a cold state) to underestimate the impact of
affective or “hot” states (Loewenstein, 1996) on their judgments and behaviors. For example,
empathy gap research has shown that when dieters are not feeling hungry, they tend to
underestimate the extent to which hunger will impact their dietary choices (Nordgren, van der
Pligt, & van Harreveld, 2008; Nordgren, van Harreveld, van der Pligt, 2009). The empathy gap
has been documented for a wide range of affective states, including sexual arousal (Ariely &
Loewenstein, 2006), fear (Van Boven, Loewenstein, & Dunning, 2005), hunger (Nisbett &
Kanouse, 1969), pain (Nordgren, McDonnell, and Loewenstein, 2011), and fatigue (Nordgren,
van der Pligt, & van Harreveld, 2007).
Hot-cold empathy gaps are thought to result from constrained memories for affective
states (Robinson & Clore, 2002; Loewenstein, 1996; Nordgren, van der Pligt, & van Harreveld,
2006). Though people can recall the situation that led to an affective state (e.g., I was distraught
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because I was going through a divorce) and can recall the relative strength of the affective state
(e.g., that was the most distraught I have ever been), they cannot freely bring forth the feeling of
the affect (e.g., re-experiencing the agitation and sadness). In other words, although everyone has
experienced fatigue, fear, and pain, if they are not currently experiencing an affective state, they
will underestimate its influence over behavior.
Constrained memory for affective experiences means that once a distressing event has
been overcome, people will have difficulty reliving their original emotional response to the
event. Because people instead rely on their immediately accessible feelings in forming
judgments, they may believe that their current “cold” state perceptions of the event reflect how
they have always felt and reacted (e.g., Read & Loewenstein, 1999; Van Boven, Loewenstein,
Dunning, & Nordgren, 2013). For example, the absence of emotional distress in response to a
divorce that an individual is “over” will produce the inference that the divorce was less painful
than was actually experienced. Because the impact of prior emotional distress is underestimated,
divorce may now seem like a life event that can be readily overcome. Support for this account
comes from research demonstrating a desensitization bias in emotional perspective-taking
(Campbell, O’Brien, Van Boven, Schwarz, & Ubel, 2014). This study found that repeated
exposure to an emotion-inducing stimulus (e.g., hearing the same joke a number of times)
reduced empathtic accuracy for others’ reactions to that stimulus (e.g., predicting how funny
others will find the joke). This occurs because people fail to account for how their emotional
reactions have diminished over time and therefore mispredict that others who encounter the
emotional stimulus for the first time would react less intensely than they in fact do.
Beyond their constrained memory for the impact of past emotional distress, people who
have endured distressing events possess the knowledge that they managed to endure the
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emotional distress. Research has shown that tasks that have been completed seem easier than
comparable tasks that have yet to be completed (e.g., Gist, 1987; Gist & Mitchell, 1992). For
example, individuals who complete a challenging task tend to subsequently view the task as less
difficult, and to predict that they could complete the task again, compared with individuals who
have yet to complete the same task (Feather, 1966, 1968; Lenney & Gold, 1982; Manderlink &
Harackiewicz, 1984). Having completed the task indicates that the task is manageable, and could
be completed again. This literature suggests that having previously endured an emotionally
distressing event may decrease the perceived difficulty of coping with that event. If past
distressing events seem easier to overcome in hindsight, those who have previously endured
distressing events may be more likely to penalize individuals who fail to endure a similar
distressing event in the present.
In sum, people who have previously endured an emotionally distressing event may utilize
two key pieces of information when making assessments of individuals struggling or failing to
endure a similar event. First, people who have endured distressing events will be unable to
actively experience the motivational force associated with the emotional distress (e.g.,
Loewenstein, 1996; Nordgren et al., 2006). Second, these individuals possess the knowledge that
they managed to endure the event. Both pieces of information should make the distressing event
seem less difficult to overcome in hindsight. We argue that this perception leads individuals to
form negative assessments of those who fail to endure the distressing event. In other words, the
combined experience of I can’t recall how difficult it was and I did it leads individuals to render
more negative evaluations (i.e., Why can’t you do it too?).
Though it may appear to be at odds with research demonstrating that prior experience
fosters compassion, our central prediction is fully compatible with these findings. Although prior
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experience may generally increase compassion for those who have endured or are currently
enduring a similar experience (e.g., Batson et al., 1996), we argue that when a target individual
fails or struggles to endure an emotionally distressing event, having endured the event will in fact
decrease compassion by decreasing the perceived difficulty of overcoming that event. To
illustrate, compared to someone who has never endured divorce, a divorcee may be more likely
to commiserate with a coworker’s day-to-day efforts while undergoing a divorce, but may also
be more prone to condemn the coworker if he succumbs to an emotional outburst at work.
Having been there herself, the divorcee can understand the individual’s situation. Yet, because
divorce seems less difficult to overcome in hindsight, emotional outburts in the workplace may
now seem unacceptable.
Unfortunately, the very conditions under which prior experience is proposed to reduce
compassion (i.e., perceivers who have previously endured distressing events, and targets who
struggle or fail to endure these events) characterize many real world situations. Struggling
graduate students may seek help from tenured faculty and members of oppressed communities
may appeal for aid from policy makers who overcame structural barriers themselves. Uncovering
the potential downsides of overcoming adversity raises novel insights into how people treat
those in need.
Current Research
In the current research, we present five studies designed to test the prediction that those
who have previously endured an emotionally distressing event will form more negative
evaluations of individuals who fail to endure a similar event. In Study 1, we test our predictions
outside of the laboratory by exploring how participants at a polar plunge—an event that requires
participants to plunge into icy water—evaluate another individual who failed to plunge, either
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before or after they participated in a plunge themselves. In Study 2, we aim to provide stronger
causal evidence for this effect by randomly assigning participants to various stages of completion
of a fatiguing exam, and then examining their evaluations of an individual who performs poorly
on the exam. Study 2 also serves to rule out a critical alternative explanation—that participants
who have endured the event are simply more knowledgeable about the event. Study 3 was
designed to explore the mechanism behind this effect by testing whether individuals who have
previously endured a distressing event render more negative evaluations of failure because the
event seems less difficult to overcome in hindsight. Next, if our reasoning is correct, this effect
should only occur when people who have endured a distressing event evaluate others who fail to
endure the emotional distress. Study 4 tests this boundary condition. Finally, Study 5 examines
whether the people’s lay beliefs match the predicted effect, or if people instead endorse the belief
that those who have previously endured a distressing event would more favorably evaluate
failures to endure the distress than would those who have never endured the event.
Studies 1 through 4 have two central conditions: a never endured and a previously
endured condition. The never endured condition comprises individuals who have no experience
with the distressing event, whereas the previously endured condition comprises individuals who
have endured the event, but are no longer actively experiencing the distress. All participants read
about and evaluated an instance in which someone failed to endure a similar emotionally
distressing event. To capture the various types of negative evaluations that are associated with
such failures, we used three types of measures—emotional reactions to the individual (Studies 1,
3, and 4), general evaluations of the individual (Studies 2 through 4), and behavioral intentions to
help (Study 2) (Nordgren et al., 2007). Compared to participants who never endured the event,
we expected that participants with who previously endured the event would form less positive
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evaluations, feel less compassion and more contempt, and be less willing to help an individual
who failed to endure a similar distressing event.
Study 1
In Study 1, we conducted a field experiment to test whether previously enduring a
distressing event would lead to more negative evaluations of those who failed to endure that
event. Specifically, we examined participants’ emotional reactions toward an individual who
failed to complete a polar plunge—an event that requires participants to enter an icy body of
water—either before (never endured condition) or after (previously endured condition) they
completed a plunge themselves. Five participants assigned to the never endured condition
indicated that they had previously completed a polar plunge or similar event in previous years,
and were excluded from the analyses. We predicted that those who had endured this distressing
event would experience less compassion and more contempt in response to another’s failure to
endure it.
Method
Participants. Participants were 54 individuals (Mage = 30.69, SDage = 9.95; 37.5%
female; 78% Caucasian, 9% Hispanic; 7% Asian American/Asian; 6% African American/Black)
from Chicago and the surrounding area.
Procedure. Participants enrolled in a March polar plunge were approached for
participation. Participants were approached in the waiting room of the event, which was an
onsite, heated indoor facility. After agreeing to participate, participants were randomly assigned
to the never endured or previously endured conditions. Participants in the never endured
condition completed the study prior to the polar plunge, whereas participants in the previously
endured condition provided their contact information and completed the study within one week
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after the polar plunge. In each condition, participants read about an individual named Pat who
joins a polar plunge team, and is determined to take the full plunge. When the day approaches,
Pat waits in the cold winter air in his swim trunks for his team’s turn. Pat decides that he cannot
endure the feeling of cold, despite his motivation to complete the plunge. Pat leaves without
completing the polar plunge. After reading the vignette, participants reported their compassion
and contempt toward Pat, and then completed control and demographic measures.
Measures
Emotion. Participants indicated the extent to which they experienced specific emotional
reactions to the polar plunger. In measures adapted from Nordgren et al. (2007), we assessed
both positive and negative emotions in the form of compassion (Batson, 1991), and contempt
(Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999), respectively. The compassion items were sympathy and
compassion (Cronbach’s α = .91), and the contempt items were contempt, anger, and disgust
(Cronbach’s α = .83). For each of the five items, we asked participants, “When you think about
the polar plunger, to what extent do you feel…?” They responded on a 7-point scale from 1 (Not
at all) to 7 (Extremely).
Control Variables. Participants in the previously endured condition indicated the
number of previous polar plunges they had attended. In addition, participants in the previously
endured condition indicated how deep they had entered the water during the polar plunge on a
scale from 1 (Did not go in) to 7 (Full body immersed). Likewise, participants in the never
endured condition indicated the level of submersion they anticipated in the plunge.
Results and Discussion
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No demographic variables yielded any effects on the dependent measures in this study,
nor did the demographic composition of the sample differ between the previously and never
endured conditions. Demographic variables will therefore be omitted from further consideration.
As predicted, participants in the previously endured condition felt less compassion
toward the failed polar plunger (M = 3.54, SD = 1.80) than participants in the never endured
condition (M = 4.60, SD = 1.43), t(52) = -2.42, p = .019, 95% CI [-1.94, -0.18], d = 0.65.
Participants in the previously endured condition also felt more contempt for the failed polar
plunger (M = 2.98, SD = 1.58) than did participants in the never endured condition (M = 1.90, SD
= 1.10), t(52) = 2.97, p = .005, 95% CI [0.35, 1.82], d = 0.79. Controlling for participants’ level
of submersion (or anticipated submersion) did not alter the results. In examining the previously
endured group, six participants had completed more than one polar plunge. Our results were
robust to the exclusion of these participants, suggesting that our results are not contingent on a
subgroup of polar plunge “experts” who may view the task differently than do those who
completed the plunge only once.
This pattern of results suggests that, as expected, having previously endured the polar
plunge decreased participants’ compassion and increased contempt toward another who failed to
endure that event. One main benefit of Study 1 is external validity—we demonstrate the effect
among active polar plunge participants in the field. To better hone in on causality, Study 2
utilized an experimental paradigm to test the proposed effect.
Study 2
In Study 1, we provided initial support for our prediction by finding that participants who
had been through the polar plunge felt more negatively about an individual who failed to endure
the cold temperatures than did those who had yet to endure the event. Our explanation of these
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results draws on the hot-cold empathy gap to suggest that constrained memory for the impact of
past emotional distress, combined with knowledge of their own ability to endure the distressing
event, led people who had endured the event to render more negative evaluations. One
alternative explanation of Study 1’s results is an informational account. It is possible that the
polar plunge was actually an easier event than one might imagine, and participants in the
previously endured condition simply possessed more knowledge. We designed Study 2 to rule
out this alternative explanation.
To do so, we randomly assigned participants to 1 of 3 conditions (currently enduring vs.
previously enduring vs. never endured) in a between-subjects design. The added currently
enduring condition allows us to rule out the possibility that the task was simply easier than the
participants expected. The currently enduring participants experienced the same distressing event
as did participants in the previously endured condition (and thus both had task experience), but
only the former made their evaluations while actively experiencing the associated emotional
distress. Thus, if the informational account is true, participants in both the previously endured
and currently enduring conditions should be less compassionate twoard an individual who fails
to endure the emotional distress. If our account holds, participants in the previously endured
condition will be less compassionate than will those currently enduring the distressing event.
Although both groups will have experience with the task, only participants currently enduring the
event will be able to appreciate the motivational force of the emotional distress.
The distressing event in question was a strenuous test of mental endurance, which was
designed to induce mental fatigue (Nordgren et al., 2006; 2007). We note that although all
people—and students in particular—have endured fatiguing examinations broadly, we argue that
the knowledge that one has made it through a particular type of event creates the tendency to
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penalize those who fail to endure the event. The knowledge that one overcame a specific event
may not generalize to related, but distinct events. For example, a law student’s completion of the
bar exam may lead her to criticize another who struggles with the bar, but not someone who
struggles to complete a medical licensing exam. Thus, to have a never endured condition, we
created a test that represented a unique experience, unfamiliar to undergraduate students.
Specifically, the test was named the Cognitive Ability and Persistence Battery (CAP-B), a test
said to be developed for use by organizations to evaluate current and prospective employees
along several dimensions, such as self-control and memory. In addition to being labelled a
unique experience, the content of the test was unusual (i.e., memorizing a series of 9-digit
number strings) compared to the type of tests that students typically complete.
Participants in all conditions were asked to evaluate an individual who struggles with the
test’s fatiguing nature, and consequently cannot complete the test. In the currently enduring
condition, participants evaluated the target individual while experiencing the fatiguing test.
Participants in the previously endured condition evaluated the individual one week after
completing2 the test. Participants in the never endured condition evaluated the individual without
having experienced the test themselves. Given that the test was ostensibly designed to assess
employee skill, we also extended our dependent measures in Study 2 to participants’ evaluations
of the employee, and their beliefs that the employee should be rehired by the organization. Our
key prediction was that participants in the previously endured condition would make less
favorable evaluations and would be less willing to rehire the employee than would those in the
currently enduring and never endured conditions.
Method
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Participants. Participants were 135 students enrolled at a large Midwestern university
(Mage = 20.68, SDage = 1.64; 64% female; 39% Caucasian, 36% Asian-American/Asian, 9%
African-American/Black, 4% East Indian, 6% Hispanic, 6% ‘Other’).
Procedure. Participants completed the study on computers in individual cubicles.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: currently enduring, previously
endured, or never endured. All participants were first informed that the purpose of the study was
to examine the use of an employee screening test (i.e., the CAP-B) in a variety of samples.
In the currently enduring condition, participants began the testing procedure upon arrival
to the laboratory. In a design adapted from Nordgren et al. (2006; 2007), participants completed
a strenuous memory test that lasted for 20 minutes. The memory test required participants to
memorize a series of 9-digit number strings. Each number string appeared for 11 seconds, after
which participants were asked to memorize the numbers for 7 seconds before they were
prompted to enter the number string to the best of their ability. After 20 minutes of the fatiguing
test, participants were asked to complete a questionnaire. At this point, participants read a
vignette about an employee who was asked to complete the CAP-B test. The employee was
motivated to perform well on the test, but became too fatigued halfway through, and could not
complete it. Participants then evaluated the employee. Finally, participants indicated their current
level of fatigue, completed open-ended questions examining awareness of the hypotheses (e.g.,
“what do you think the researchers are testing in this study?”), and were debriefed. No
participants indicated awareness of our specific research hypotheses.
The previously endured condition was similar to the currently enduring condition except
that participants evaluated the employee one week after completing the fatiguing test. After
completing the test themselves, participants in the previously endured condition were informed
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that there would be a follow-up questionnaire to collect additional information about their
perceptions of the CAP-B. Upon beginning the follow-up survey, participants were shown a
description of the test and asked whether or not they recalled participating in the test. All
participants recalled the experience. Participants then completed the vignette portion of the study
and were debriefed as in the currently enduring condition.
Finally, participants in the never endured condition did not complete the fatiguing test.
Instead, upon arrival to the laboratory, participants in the never endured condition viewed a
description of the test and sample questions before completing the vignette portion of the study.
Materials
Manipulation Check. To ensure whether participants in the currently enduring condition
were distinguishable from those in the previously endured or never endured conditions in terms
of fatigue, participants indicated their current levels of fatigue on a scale from 1 (Not at all
fatigued) to 7 (Very fatigued).
Employee Evaluations. To assess participants’ evaluations of the employee, participants
rated the employee on two dimensions related to competence (“competent” and “capable”) on
sliding scales from 0 (Not at all) to 100 (Extremely) (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002). The
mean of these items served as an index of competence (r = .89).
Willingness to Rehire. To assess possible behavioral consequences for the employee, we
asked participants to recommend whether or not the employee’s contract should be renewed.
Participants completed three items related to willingness to rehire (e.g., “I would definitely
renew this employee’s contract”) on scales from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree). The
mean of these items served as an index of willingness to rehire (Cronbach’s α = .85).
Results and Discussion
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No demographic variables yielded any effects on the dependent measures in this study,
and will be omitted from further consideration.
Manipulation Check. To examine whether our test was indeed a fatiguing event, we
conducted a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) examining the effect of condition on
current fatigue. The results revealed a significant main effect of condition on fatigue, F(2, 132) =
4.44, MSE = 1.94, p = .014, η2 = 0.06. Based on recommendations to use planned contrasts to test
specific research questions (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1985; Stieger, 2004), we conducted a planned
contrast to examine whether participants in the currently enduring condition (+2) reported
significantly higher levels of fatigue than did participants in the never endured (-1) or previously
endured conditions (-1). The results revealed that participants in the currently enduring condition
reported significantly higher levels of fatigue (M = 4.79, SD = 1.08) than did participants in the
never endured (M = 4.05, SD = 1.57) or previously endured conditions (M = 4.03, SD = 1.47),
t(132) = 2.95, p = .004, 95% CI [0.49, 2.50], d = 0.51, indicating that our manipulation was
successful.
Next, to examine the dependent measures, we conducted a series of one-way ANOVAs
with planned contrasts. Specifically, planned contrasts examined whether participants in the
previously endured condition (-2) gave the employee significantly less favorable evaluations and
were less willing to rehire the employee than were participants in the never endured (+1) or
currently enduring conditions (+1).
Employee Evaluations. A one-way ANOVA revealed that competence evaluations
varied significantly by condition, F(2, 132) = 5.63, MSE = 274.66, p = .005, η2 = .079. In line
with our predictions, the planned contrast revealed that participants in the previously endured
condition rated the employee as significantly less competent (M = 41.86, SD = 18.84) than did
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participants in the never endured condition (M = 47.37, SD = 15.97) and the currently enduring
condition (M = 54.29, SD = 15.63), t(132) = 2.67, p = .008, 95% CI [4.67, 31.22], d = 0.46.
Willingness to Rehire. There was also a significant effect of condition on willingness to
renew the contract, F(2, 132) = 3.96, MSE = 0.86, p = .021, η2 = 0.059. As predicted, the planned
contrast revealed that participants in the previously endured condition were significantly less
willing to rehire the employee (M = 4.36, SD = 0.79) than were participants in the never endured
condition (M = 4.71, SD = 0.89) and the currently enduring conditions (M = 4.98, SD = 1.05),
t(132) = 2.52, p = .013, 95% CI [0.20, 1.68], d = 0.43.
Taken together, the results of Study 2 support our predictions. Participants in the
previously endured condition were less willing to rehire and provided less favorable evaluations
of the employee who struggled with the test than did those in the never endured and currently
enduring conditions. It is important that this difference persisted when including the currently
enduring condition because it rules out an information account for this effect; participants in the
currently enduring condition completed the same test as did the participants who previously
endured the test (and thus possessed similar knowledge about the test), but only the former made
their evaluations while actively experiencing the associated mental fatigue.
Study 3
In the first two studies, we found that, across two different events, people who had
previously endured a distressing event evaluated another’s failure to endure that event more
negatively than did those who had never endured (or were currently enduring) that event. The
goal of Study 3 was to examine the process that drives this effect. Prior research has found that
people have a constrained memory for affective states, and once a state is overcome, they can no
longer appreciate its motivational force (Nordgren et al., 2006). Moreover, unlike people who

COMPASSION FOR DISTRESS

19

have not endured or are currently enduring a distressing event, people who have endured a
distressing event might use the knowledge that they managed to endure the event when they
make assessments of another’s struggles to endure. We predict that the combination of a
constrained memory for the impact of past emotional distress and knowledge of one’s own
completion of the event makes the event seem easier to overcome, which, in turn, makes
struggling with the event appear more blameworthy (Alicke, 2000). Based on this reasoning, we
predicted that the perceived difficulty of overcoming the emotionally distressing event would
mediate the effect of enduring the event on evaluations of another’s failure to endure.
We tested these predictions in the context of unemployment, a life event in which a
person is actively searching for employment, but is unable to find work. A large body of research
has accumulated to suggest that unemployment is an emotionally distressing life event (e.g.,
Grossi, 1999; McKee-Ryan, Song, Wanberg, & Kinicki, 2005). Thus, in Study 3, participants in
varying states of unemployment (currently enduring vs. previously endured vs. never endured)
read a scenario about a man who begins selling drugs because he is unable to find work.
Participants then rated how much compassion they felt for the unemployed individual and
provided general evaluations of the individual.
Method
Participants. Participants were 227 American residents drawn from Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk (Mage = 33.37, SDage = 11.82; 44% female; 78% Caucasian; 8% Asian
American/Asian; 5% Hispanic; 5% African American/Black; 4% ‘Other’).
Procedure. Participants were recruited for the study on the basis of their responses to a
preselection survey. The currently enduring group consisted of involuntarily unemployed people
actively seeking employment. The previously endured group consisted of people who are
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currently employed, but had previously been unemployed while actively searching for
employment. Finally, the never endured group consisted of people who are currently employed,
and have never experienced an interruption in their employment since their first job. During the
study, participants read about a man struggling to make ends meet. The man had attempted to
apply to many jobs, but with no luck. Though he was motivated to persist and find gainful
employment, he felt distressed by the constant rejection and lack of progress. One day, the man
was approached by a friend who needed help selling small quantities of illegal drugs. Fed up
with dealing with unemployment, he immediately took the offer and ended his search for (legal)
employment. After reading the vignette, participants then completed the dependent measures and
control variables.
Measures
Compassion. Participants indicated the extent to which they experienced compassion
toward the man as in Study 1.
General Evaluations. Participants also completed measures that assessed their general
attitudes toward the unemployed individual. Specifically, participants rated the man on four
evaluative dimensions (good, bad; positive, negative; like, dislike; and desirable, undesirable)
on 7-point scales (Cronbach’s α = .91) (Nordgren et al., 2007).
Perceived Difficulty. Participants completed an item designed to assess the perceived
difficulty of unemployment (“It is difficult to overcome being unemployed”) on a scale from 1
(Completely disagree) to 7 (Completely agree).
Control Variables. In addition to measuring employment status, we assessed relevant
control variables: political orientation, socioeconomic status, geographic location, education, and
demographic variables. It is possible that factors such as political orientation are related to both
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employment status and evaluations of the unemployed. Participants in the previously endured
and currently enduring conditions also completed items assessing the length and frequency of the
job search (e.g., “How long ago were you unemployed?”/”How long have you been
unemployed?”), and the activeness of their job search while unemployed (number of resumes
sent, intensity of job search). Participants in the never endured and previously endured
conditions indicated whether they were employed full- or part-time, and the occupational
category of their job.
Results and Discussion
As in Study 2, we conducted a series of one-way ANOVAs, followed by planned
contrasts examining whether participants in the previously endured condition (-2) reported
significantly less compassion, less favorable evaluations of the individual, and lower peceived
difficulty to overcome unemployment than did participants in the never endured (+1) or currently
enduring conditions (+1).
Compassion. A one-way ANOVA revealed that compassion varied by unemployment
group, F(2, 224) = 6.20, MSE = 2.00, p = .002, η2 = .052. The planned contrast demonstrated that
participants who previously endured unemployment experienced significantly less compassion
toward the individual (M = 4.36, SD = 1.54) than did participants who never endured
unemployemt (M = 4.78, SD = 1.37), and participants currently experiencing unemployment (M
= 5.15, SD = 1.31), t(224) = 3.10, p = .002, 95% CI [0.44, 1.98], d = 0.41.
Evaluations. Likewise, ratings of the individual varied significantly by unemployment
group, F(2, 224) = 6.99, MSE = 1.34, p = .001, η2 = .059. The planned contrast revealed that
participants who previously endured unemployment made less favorable evaluations of the
individual (M = 3.87, SD = 1.08) than did participants who never endured (M = 4.22, SD = 1.21)
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and were currently enduring unemployment (M = 4.56, SD = 1.19), t(224) = 3.27, p = .001, 95%
CI [0.41, 1.67], d = 0.43.
Perceived Difficulty. There was also a significant effect of unemployment group on the
perceived difficulty of overcoming unemployment, F(2, 224) = 3.71, MSE = 2.75, p = .026, η2 =
.03. As predicted, participants in the previously endured group thought unemployment was less
difficult to overcome (M = 4.60, SD = 1.62) than did never endured participants (M = 5.01, SD =
1.84), and currently enduring participants (M = 5.48, SD = 1.48), t(224) = 2.35, p = .028, 95% CI
[0.07, 1.87], d = 0.33.
Mediation. We also tested whether the perceived difficulty of overcoming
unemployment mediated the negative effect of enduring the event on compassion. A
bootstrapping analysis of mediation (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) with 10, 000 re-samples with
replacement indicated a significant indirect effect, with a point estimate of .07, and a 95 percent
bias-corrected confidence interval of [0.006, 0.196]. This suggests that decreased perceived
difficulty of overcoming unemployment mediated the effect of previously enduring on
compassion. Participants who previously endured unemployment were less compassionate
because they thought unemployment was less difficult to overcome.
Next, focusing on evaluations of the unemployed individual, the bootstrapping analysis
estimated the indirect effect to be .15, with a 95 percent bias corrected interval of [0.06, 0.29].
Again, this interval excluded zero, suggesting that the perceived difficulty of overcoming
unemployment also mediated the effect of overcoming unemployment on the negativity of
evaluations of the individual.
Control Variables. When examining the control variables, only length of
unemployment for participants currently enduring unemployment was significantly related to
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compassion, β = .22, t(74) = 1.96, p = .054, with longer times since last employment predicting
increased compassion for the individual. It is likely that the frustrations and hardships associated
with unemployment develop over time, increasing its perceived difficulty, and thus increasing
compassionate feelings toward an individual struggling with unemployment. We therefore
conducted supplementary analyses to investigate whether the effects of unemployment group
were limited to participants who had been unemployed for a long time. To do so, we tested
whether length of unemployment moderated the effect of unemployment status on compassion
and evaluations of the individual.3 Specifically, we employed moderated regression analyses and
regressed the dependent measures onto length of unemployment, unemployment group (+1 =
previously endured; -1 = currently enduring), and their interaction. Only unemployment group
was a significant predictor of compassion (β = -.21, p = .019) and evaluations of the unemployed
individual (β = -.25, p = .006). The other effects were nonsignificant, including the interaction
(βcompassion = -.14, p = .222; βevaluations = -.13, p = .262), indicating that our results hold regardless
of participants’ length of unemployment.
Taken together, the results of Study 3 further support our predictions. The mediated
relationship gives support to our explanation for the effect of enduring the event on the
evaluation of another’s failure to endure. We found that individuals who previously endured
unemployment believed that unemployment was less difficult to overcome, and this in turn
predicted reduced compassion and more negative evaluations of an individual who commits
illegal acts in response to unemployment. The results of Study 3 again help to rule out an
information account. Participants who previously endured unemployment made less favorable
evaluations than did currently enduring and never endured participants. If enduring
unemployment simply increased participants’ knowledge that the event was not as difficult as
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predicted, we would expect both currently and previously unemployed participants to both make
less favorable evaluations.
Study 4
Study 4 served two main goals. First, we have proposed that enduring an emotionally
distressing event can lead to negative evaluations of individuals who fail to endure a similar
event. Integrating the current framework with past research on experience and sympathy (e.g.,
Batson et al., 1996), we propose that an important boundary condition of the current finding is
the perceived failure of another individual to adequately endure a distressing event. Specifically,
we predict that past research suggesting that prior experience increases sympathy holds for
perceptions of individuals currently enduring the event, whereas the current effect exists for the
perceptions of individuals perceived to struggle or fail to endure the event. Having endured
distress may facilitate the perspective-taking and self-simulation required for sympathy (e.g.,
Bandura, 1969; Batson, 1987, 1991), but lead to the underestimation of the impact of the
affective states experienced by another who fails to endure the distressing event. To test these
predictions, participants who had either never or previously endured bullying evaluated a bullied
teen who either violently aggresses against the perpetrators and nearby innocent students
(bullying-induced failure condition) or continues to endure the experience (managing-to-endure
condition). “Fighting back”, and lashing out against others is largely assumed to be a
maladaptive means of coping (Schwartz, 2000; Zapf & Gross, 2001). Consistent with this notion,
a pretest of the vignettes revealed that participants rated the teen in the bullying-induced failure
vignette as coping significantly worse with the emotional distress compared with the teen in the
managing-to-endure vignette.4
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Second, Study 4 served to rule out an alternative explanation. We have argued that
individuals who have previously endured an emotionally distressing event will form more
negative evaluations of failures to endure a similar distressing event. One alternative explanation
is that overcoming a distressing event shapes general evaluations of failure to endure (e.g.,
decreased tolerance for “giving up”) rather than failure induced by the distressing event in
particular. In other words, having endured bullying may decrease tolerance for failures to endure
regardless of the cause of that distress, perhaps by increasing the perceived importance of
resilience. One way to rule out this alternative explanation is to examine the specificity of this
effect. To do so, we added a control condition: grief-induced failure. If enduring bullying only
influences the evaluation of a corresponding failure to endure distress (i.e., bullying-induced
failure), and does not influence evaluations of unrelated failures to endure (e.g., grief-induced
failure), then it would support our explanation.
We tested these predictions by randomly assigning participants to 1 of 3 conditions
(bullying-induced failure vs. managing-to-endure vs. grief-induced failure) in a between-subjects
design. The primary dependent measures were participants’ evaluations of and compassion
toward the other. We predicted that, compared to those who never endured bullying, participants
who had previously endured bullying would feel more positively about and more compassion
toward the bullied teen in the managing-to-endure condition, but feel less positively about and
less compassion toward the teen in the bullying-induced failure condition. We predicted that
participants’ experience enduring bullying would not influence evaluations of grief-induced
failure.
Participants. Participants were 323 individuals (Mage = 31.63 years, SDage = 11.38 years;
41% female; ethnicity not reported) recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.
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Procedure. Prior to the study, participants responded to a questionnaire regarding their
history with bullying. Participants were sorted into previously endured and never endured groups
based on their responses to a dichotomous measure assessing history of bullying (“were you ever
bullied or teased?”) (McCabe, Antony, Summerfeldt, Liss, & Swinson, 2003). Participants also
indicated the length, severity, and frequency of bullying to provide convergent evidence for this
measure.
During the study, participants read a vignette about a high school student. In the bullyinginduced failure and managing-to-endure conditions, the student had recently moved to a new
high school and had been repeatedly teased and bullied by the other students. The student
experienced daily feelings of hurt and humiliation. One day at the cafeteria, a group of bullies
began to publicly tease the student in the cafeteria and threw a half-eaten apple at him. In the
bullying-induced failure condition, following the provocation, the student lost control over his
emotions, and behaved violently toward the bullies and other nearby students. Several students
were hurt and needed to receive medical attention. In the managing-to-endure condition, the
student was hurt by the experience, but continued to endure the emotional and physical pain
associated with bullying. In the grief-induced failure condition, the student commits the same
acts of aggression as in the bullying-induced failure condition, but the aggression is said to stem
from the grief associated with the loss of a sibling. Following the vignette, participants
completed the dependent measures and control variables. Finally, participants answered
demographic questions.
Materials
Compassion. Participants completed the compassion measures as in Studies 1 and 3.
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General Evaluations. Participants also completed measures that assessed their general
evaluations of the bullied student as in Study 3.
Control Variables. In addition to the primary dependent measures, we assessed the
severity, length, and frequency of participants’ experience with bullying. Severity of bullying
was measured on a scale from 1 (I wasn’t bullied at all) to 5 (Extremely serious), and frequency
of bullying was measured on a scale from 1 (Never bullied) to 7 (Constantly bullied).
Participants indicated length of bullying by responding to an open-ended question (“For how
long were you bullied?”)
Given that individuals who previously endured bullying, but responded similarly to the
struggling protagonist, may not be as punitive as those who responded in a less aggressive
manner, we assessed participants’ own reactions to bullying. To do so, participants completed
the Retrospective Bullying Questionnaire (Schäfer et al., 2004), which assessed which of 10
strategies they had used to cope with bullying, if any (e.g., “I tried to avoid the situation,” “I got
help from family/parents,” “I fought back”). Participants were permitted to select more than one
strategy. To ensure that no participants were currently enduring bullying, participants indicated
whether or not they were currently being bullied on a dichotomous ‘yes’ or ‘no’ item, and the
frequency of current bullying from 0 (Not bullied) to 5 (Daily). Only participants who indicated
no current bullying were included in the study.
Results and Discussion
First, to provide support for the validity of our dichotomous measure of bullying, we
analyzed whether severity and frequency of bullying differed depending on participants’
responses to the dichotomous measure (cf., Schäfer et al., 2004). Participants who responded
“yes” to the dichotomous bullying measure indicated that they were bullied more frequently (M
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= 3.09, SD = 0.72) than did those who responded “no” (M = 1.35, SD = 0.55), t(320) = 24.07, p <
.001, 95% CI [1.59, 1.88], d = 2.69, and also indicated that they were bullied more severely (M =
3.40, SD = 0.73) than did those who responded no (M = 2.13, SD = 1.32), t(320) = 10.96, p <
.001, 95% CI [1.05, 1.50], d = 1.23.
Compassion. A 2 (bullying history: previously endured vs. never endured) x 3 (scenario:
bullying-induced failure vs. managing-to-endure vs. grief-induced failure) ANOVA revealed a
significant main effect of scenario condition, F(2, 317) = 48.64, MSE = 2.75, p < .001, η2 = .235,
and no main effect of bullying history, F(1, 319) = 0.10, MSE = 2.75, p = .752, η2 < .01. This was
qualified, however, by the predicted bullying history by scenario interaction, F(2, 317) = 3.22,
MSE = 2.75, p = .041, η2 = .020 (see Figure 1). Within the bullying-induced failure condition,
participants who previously endured bullying were significantly less compassionate toward the
student (M = 4.89, SD = 1.35) than were those who never endured bullying (M = 5.43, SD =
1.11), F(1, 319) = -2.16, p = .033, 95% CI [-1.03, -0.05], d = 0.44. By contrast, within the
managing-to-endure condition, participants who previously endured bullying were marginally
more compassionate toward the student (M = 5.98, SD = 1.02) than were those who never
endured bullying (M = 5.68, SD = 1.03), F(1, 319) = 1.66, p = .099, 95% CI [-0.06, 0.65], d =
0.29. As predicted, no significant differences emerged between previously endured participants
(M = 4.15, SD = 1.38) and never endured participants (M = 4.05, SD = 1.81) in compassion
toward the student in the grief-induced failure condition, F(1, 317) = 0.31, p = .76, 95% CI [0.57, 0.78], d = 0.06.
General Evaluations. A 2 (bullying history: previously endured vs. never endured) x 3
(scenario: bullying-induced failure vs. managing-to-endure vs. grief-induced failure) ANOVA
revealed a significant main effect of scenario condition, F(2, 317) = 103.46, MSE = 1.08, p <
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.001, η2 = .395, indicating more positive evaluations of the student who did not aggress against
others, and no main effect of bullying history, F(1, 317) = 0.28, MSE = 1.08, p = .595, η2 = .001.
This was qualified, however, by the predicted bullying history by scenario interaction, F(2, 317)
= 4.52, MSE = 1.08, p = .012, η2 = .028. Within the bullying-induced failure condition,
participants who previously endured bullying made marginally less favorable evaluations of the
student (M = 4.20, SD = 1.25) than did those who never endured bullying (M = 4.62, SD = 0.91),
F(1, 317) = -1.95, p = .054, 95% CI [-0.84, 0.01], d = 0.38. By contrast, within the managing-toendure condition, participants who endured bullying made significantly more favorable
evaluations of the student (M = 5.51, SD = 1.01) than did those who never endured bullying (M
= 5.12, SD = 0.98), F(1, 317) = 2.24, p = .027, 95% CI [0.04, 0.83], d = 0.39. Again, no
significant differences emerged between previously endured participants (M = 3.36, SD = 1.01)
and never endured participants (M = 3.15, SD = 1.00) in compassion toward the student in the
grief-induced failure condition, F(1, 317) = 1.00, p = .321, 95% CI [-0.21, 0.64], d = 0.20.
Control Variables. In assessing the control variables, gender was a significant predictor
of compassion, F(1, 321) = 10.66, MSE = 2.07, p = .001, η2 = .032, with females reporting higher
levels of compassion for the bullied student. This finding is consistent with some past research
(e.g., Batson et al., 1996; Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983). However, an ANOVA examining the
effect of gender, bullying history, and condition on compassion revealed no significant
interaction with gender, [F3-way interaction(2, 311) = 1.02, MSE = 1.57, p = .360, η2 = .007], nor did
controlling for gender change the pattern of results.
We also conducted supplemental analyses examining the effects of participants’ selfreported coping styles. Specifically, we examined the effects of participants’ own retaliation
(fought back = 1; did not fight back = 0), scenario condition, and their interaction on compassion
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and evaluations of the teen in a two-way ANOVA.5 Only a significant main effect of scenario
condition emerged to predict compassion [F(2, 170) = 27.11, MSE = 1.53, p < .001, η2 = .242]
and evaluations of the teen [F(2, 170) = 42.92, MSE = 1.18, p < .001, η2 = .336]. The scenario by
retaliation interactions did not reach significance [Fcompassion(2, 170) = 2.02, MSE = 1.53, p =
.136, η2 = .023; Fevaluations(2, 170) = 1.69, MSE = 1.18, p = .187, η2 = .020], and there were no
main effects of retaliation.6 These null effects are perhaps due to the low number of participants
who indicated that they fought back across scenario conditions (n = 46). This is a point to which
we return in the General Discussion.
The results of Study 4 provide evidence for an important boundary condition of the
effect: the perceived failure of another to endure the distressing event. When evaluating an
individual enduring an emotionally distressing event, having endured the event facilitates
compassion, likely by facilitating the ease with which the other’s perspective is adopted (“I’ve
been there too”; Batson, 1987, 1991; Batson et al., 1996). When evaluating an individual who
fails to endure the distressing event, having previously endured the event may reduce
compassion because the event seems less difficult to overcome in hindsight. In turn, others’
struggles to adequately endure the event seem unacceptable. Importantly, the results of Study 4
also rule out the alternative explanation that previously enduring distress shapes evaluations of
failures to endure broadly, and instead supports our prediction that that enduring distress
influences the evaluation of a corresponding failure to endure.
Study 5
In Study 5, we sought to test whether people’s lay beliefs would match our pattern of
data. In other words, would people intuitively understand the results of the current paper, or
would they mistakenly believe that individuals who have previously endured a distressing event
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would more favorably evaluate failures to endure? In many cases, shared experiences do foster
sympathy, as when perceivers are actively experiencing the emotional distress (Studies 2 and 3),
or the target is perceived to endure the distress (Study 4). Because people who have endured
distress have “been there, too”, observers may mistakenly predict that people who have endured
a distressing event would render more favorable evaluations of failures to endure than would
those who have not endured this experience.
To test this possibility, we described the bullying-induced failure scenario from Study 4
to a new group of participants. These participants then predicted which of two teachers would be
less likely to penalize the bullied teen’s violence: a teacher who managed to endure bullying at a
similar age, or a teacher who never endured bullying.
Method
Participants. Participants were 112 individuals (Mage = 31.63 years, SDage = 10.01 years;
67% male; ethnicity not reported) recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.
Procedure. Online participants enrolled in a study ostensibly about interpersonal
decision-making. Participants were presented with descriptions of scenarios, and were asked
three questions about their decision-making in these scenarios (e.g., “which of the following
individuals would you be more likely to approach for information about jazz music? Person A is
an expert in classical music, and Person B is an expert in folk music.”) Embedded in these
scenarios was the critical measure. Specifically, participants were provided with the bullyinginduced failure vignette from Study 4. Following the vignette, participants were informed that
the bullied teen would now face one of two teachers following his actions: Teacher A who
“overcame bullying as a teen”, or Teacher B who “has no previous experience with bullying.”
Participants were then asked to indicate which teacher the teen should approach to receive a
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more lenient punishment. Participants then completed the questionnaire regarding their history
with bullying as in Study 4, to examine whether bullying history would affect their predictions.
We predicted that all participants—regardless of bullying history—would believe that the
teacher who endured bullying would be less likely to penalize the teen’s failure to endure
bullying.
Results and Discussion
As predicted, most participants (99 out of 112) predicted that the teacher who had
previously endured bullying would more favorably evaluate the teen’s failure to endure, χ2 (1, N
= 112) = 66.04, p < .001, w = .77. Most participants who previously endured bullying (42 out of
45), χ2(1, N = 45) = 33.80, p < .001, w = .87, and who never endured bullying (57 out of 67) were
more likely to select the teacher who previously endured bullying, χ2(1, N = 67) = 32.97, p <
.001, w = .70. There were no significant differences in teacher selection between these groups,
χ2(1, N = 112) = 1.79, p = .181, w = .13. These results suggest that people mispredict the extent
to which those who have endured a distressing event will be more compassionate toward
another’s failure to endure distress.
General Discussion
When struggling to endure an emotionally distressing event, it would seem that people
should turn to those who have endured that same experience. Yet it appears that this intuition
may be misguided, as it fails to take into account the psychological consequences of enduring
these distressing events. Across five studies, we demonstrated that previously enduring an
emotionally distressing event led to more negative evaluations of those who failed to endure a
similar emotionally distressing event. In Study 1, people who previously completed a polar
plunge felt less compassion and more contempt for an individual who failed to complete the
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polar plunge. Study 2 ruled out a critical alternative explanation—that participants who endured
the distress are simply more knowledgeable about the experience—and found that participants
who previously endured a fatiguing test more negatively evaluated another’s failure to endure
that test than did participants who had never endured or were currently enduring the test.
Building on these initial results, Study 3 explored the process behind this effect, finding
that participants who had previously endured unemployment penalized another’s failure to
endure unemployment because they viewed this experience as less difficult to overcome.
Moreover, Study 4 revealed that the effect is specific to evaluations of failures to endure:
Compared to participants who had never endured an emotionally distressing event, participants
who had endured the event made less favorable evaluations of an individual failing to endure, but
made more favorable evaluations of an individual who was managing to endure the event.
Finally, in Study 5, observers failed to anticipate this effect of enduring distressing events,
instead believing that someone who had endured distress would be most lenient toward failures
to endure. By testing our predictions across a wide range of distressing events and instances of
struggle and failure (from merely opting out of a polar plunge to engaging in illegal behavior),
we have provided evidence for the generalizability of this effect. The current research suggests
that experience offers a powerful tool for predicting and understanding who will be the most
sympathetic in the face of failure to endure distress.
Theoretical Implications
Our results have important theoretical implications for the empathy gap perspective.
Typically, research in this paradigm compares participants in either a “hot state” (e.g.,
experiencing pain) or a “cold state” (e.g., people not experiencing pain) along measures such as
empathy toward someone experiencing a similar situation. Such an approach conflates the effects
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of emotional states (feeling pain) with knowledge about the experience (knowing what the
painful experience was like). Thus, it has remained unclear how previously enduring a hot state
(i.e., knowledge without the accompanying emotional state) would affect feelings toward another
facing a similar situation. The current research provides initial evidence for the importance of
disentangling these factors by suggesting that actively shared emotional experience is critical to
the formation of positive interpersonal judgments, whereas knowledge without emotion may, in
some cases, have negative consequences for interpersonal judgment. Of course, people who
have, for example, overcome unemployment may possess different knowledge than do those who
are currently unemployed, and thus future research should continue to explore the orthogonal
effects of emotional states and experiential knowledge on sympathy for others’ struggles.
In highlighting the importance of decoupling emotional states from knowledge, the
current research also complements recent work proposing a desensitization bias in emotional
perspective-taking (Campbell et al., 2014). In Campbell et al.’s research, repeated exposure to an
emotion-inducing stimulus (e.g., hearing the same joke a number of times) reduced empathic
accuracy for others’ reactions to that stimulus (e.g., predicting how funny others will find the
joke) by attenuating participants’ own emotional reactions. Though examining different aspects
of experience (too much experience versus having endured an experience), and different
consequences (empathic accuracy versus evaluations of failure), both approaches underscore the
importance of actively experiencing emotion in forming interpersonal judgments.
Outside of the empathy gap perspective, other literatures examining shared experiences
could benefit from exploring the distinction between currently and previously enduring events.
Given the impact that shared experiences have on a diverse array of phenomena, such as memory
(Hirst, Manier, & Cuc, 2003; Weldon, 2001), cognition (Barsalou, Niedenthal, Barbey, &

COMPASSION FOR DISTRESS

35

Ruppert, 2003), and communication in groups (Levine & Higgins, 2001), it may be important for
future research to examine the potentially divergent effects of currently and previously shared
experiences on other outcomes. For example, on-the-job training programs are shared
experiences used to socialize new individuals into organizations. If these programs are led by
individuals who have long ago completed the program, these leaders may now underestimate the
difficulty of acquiring the skills taught by the program, leading them to produce a deprived
learning experience.
Limitations and Issues for Future Research
Despite the advances made by the current studies, there are remaining questions that
should be addressed in future research. First, we examined the effect of enduring distress on
evaluations among individuals who managed to endure the event (i.e., completed the exam,
entered the icy water). It remains unclear how individuals with prior experience, but who failed
to endure the distress, would respond. One possibility is that failing to endure the event increases
compassion by increasing the perceived difficulty of overcoming that event (e.g., Zuckerman,
1979). Consistent with this suggestion, participants in Study 4 who also responded to bullying
with violence were marginally more likely to be compassionate toward the bullying-induced
failure. We are, however, reluctant to make conclusions based on these data, given the low
number of participants who reported that they had fought back.
A potential counterpoint to this prediction is that, even if an individual previously
struggled to endure a distressing event, she may recall her ability to endure the event in a more
favorable light than reflects reality. Research has accumulated to suggest that people tend to
distort negative autobiographical information to become more positive and self-enhancing over
time (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2008; Gramzow & Willard, 2006; Mather & Carstensen,
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2005). Thus, outside of clear, unambiguous failures to endure (e.g., not completing a
comprehensive exam), motivated reasoning may prevent the accurate recall of one’s own
difficulty with the event. In turn, reduced compassion for those who fail to endure the event may
persist.
As a practical matter, we also note that, in many situations, distinguishing between
unsuccessful and successful prior experience groups presents some complications. Namely, those
who have failed to endure the distressing event often cannot be distinguished from those
currently enduring the event; individuals who fail to overcome unemployment remain
unemployed, and those who fail to quit smoking are still smokers and experience the associated
cravings. Future research should nonetheless seek to tease apart the effects of prior experience
and success on evaluations.
The current research likewise generates questions about how aspects of the experience
itself influence evaluations of failures to endure. Given that the perceived ease with which the
event can be overcome seems to drive the effect, manipulating aspects of the experience that
affect recall of the distress may affect failure evaluations. For example, Kahneman, Fredrickson,
Schreiber, and Redelmeier (1993) found that adding a few moments of less intense pain near the
end of a distressing event can decrease retrospective evaluations of the overall intensity of the
pain. Based on our theorizing, we would anticipate that people who experienced less distress
near the end of an event may be more prone to penalize another’s failure to endure compared
with people who experienced constant (or increased) distress near the end of an event.
Importantly, these results would also suggest that individual differences in habituation versus
sensitization to emotional experiences might be an important predictor of compassion toward
perceived failure to endure (Campbell et al., 2014).
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Finally, the current findings might be used to shed light on an important question in the
political sphere: How do people from marginalized groups respond to members of their
community once they have achieved success? Previous work addressing this question has
suggested that members of marginalized communities (e.g., women, Black Americans) who
achieve political or corporate success often espouse a conservative ideology that downplays
structural barriers to success for others who share their identity (Zweigenhaft & Domhoff, 1998).
Although this phenomenon has been attributed to strategic positioning on the part of elites (e.g.,
Lewis, 2013), the current research would also suggest that diluted memories of struggling to
overcome barriers combined with knowledge of their own success leads successful members of
oppressed groups to become more receptive to the conservative individualist ideology that
emphasize individual agency over structural constraint. Given the continued importance of this
question, future work should explore potential empathy gaps among members of minority groups
when they reach the top.
Applications
The current research has important implications for interpersonal dynamics, as well as
policies regarding how people treat others facing distressing life events. Many social programs
are designed with the input of those who endured distressing events, including rehab programs
designed by former addicts, and social welfare programs crafted by individuals who used to live
in poverty themselves.7
In this vein, a pressing direction for future work is the exploration of strategies that may
combat the negative effects of enduring distress on compassion toward others’ struggles. The
critical question is whether there are ways for people to maintain the empathy afforded by the
distressing event once they return to a cold state. Perhaps this can be achieved by having people
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reflect and commit to their evaluations during an experience (e.g., writing down or verbalizing
views during the search for employment) or by having people take notice of their own struggles
during the experience. This approach aims to increase sympathetic responding to others’ failures
by bridging the gap between hot and cold perspectives.
An alternative approach might be to encourage perceivers to place less emphasis on their
own subjective experience with the event when assessing others’ failures. For example, a
counselor who overcame addiction could consider other struggling patients or the high number
of people who relapse when trying to forgive a patient’s transgressions. This approach
acknowledges the difficulty inherent in reliving one’s own affective states, and instead facilitates
conscious correction against potential bias (e.g., Wegener & Petty, 1995).
Conclusion
At the outset of this article, we posed a question: When struggling with an emotionally
distressing event, such as divorce or the loss of a loved one, are people best served by seeking
help from others with or without similar experiences? Despite widespread beliefs in the power of
shared experience to facilitate compassion, we have shown that, for people failing to endure the
distress, those who have previously endured a similar experience may represent the toughest
critics. This finding has important consequences for how people treat those in need, and who will
be most likely to help the distressed. Future research may seek to unveil interventions that
combat the negative effects of enduring distress on evaluations of failure.
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Footnotes

1

In this paper, we will use the term emotional distress to describe situations in which

people must cope with unpleasant affective states in order to achieve their goals. These states
refer to a wide range of negative emotions (e.g., anger, fear, sadness), drive, and feeling states
(e.g., pain, fatigue) (cf., Loewenstein, 2000).
2

All participants successfully completed the test. Given that participants evaluated an

individual who failed to endure the test, overcoming the experience was operationalized as
completion of the test, rather than some performance metric.
3

Only participants in the currently enduring and previously endured unemployment groups

(n = 160, 70% of the sample) were included in these analyses, as these were the only groups for
whom length of unemployment was an appropriate measure.
4

A pretest examined whether the teen was viewed as differentially enduring the distress in

the failure versus managing-to-endure conditions. Sixty-six online participants read both
scenarios and then completed three items assessing perceived coping (e.g., “He is handling the
situation as best he can”) on scales from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree). The results
indicated that participants viewed the teen in the failure condition as coping significantly worse
with the distress (M = 2.48, SD = 1.12) compared with the teen in managing-to-endure condition
(M = 4.15, SD = 1.10), t(65) = -13.59, p < .001, d = 3.37.
5

As in Study 3, only participants who had previously endured bullying (n = 176, 55% of the

sample) were included in these analyses, as these were the only groups for whom coping
strategies was an appropriate measure.
6

None of the other coping strategies yielded significant main effects or interactions on the

dependent measures.
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As a caveat to these points, we note that those who have previously endured distressing

events are not necessarily inaccurate in their perceptions of the experience itself. In many cases,
people who have endured distress are correct in noting what is possible to achieve, such as the
veteran polar plunger telling novices that the experience is manageable. Nonetheless, from the
perspective of those struggling, it is beneficial to know from whom to seek help or comfort.
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Figure 1. Mean compassion as a function of bullying history and scenario condition (±SE) in
Study 4.

